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Abstract 
 
Although methods of analysis based on Bayes‟ theorem have had rich applications in Law 
and in Medicine they have not been much used in Economics. We use Bayes‟ theorem to 
construct two concepts of the “risk” associated with belonging to a particular group in terms 
of a favourable labour market outcome; this, in the Indian context, is taken as being in 
“regular employment”.  The first concept, the Employment Risk Ratio, measures the odds of a 
person being in regular employment to being in non-regular employment, given that he 
belongs to a particular group.  The second, the Group Risk Ratio, measures the odds of a 
person being in regular employment, given that he belongs to one group against belonging to 
another group.  We then apply these concepts of risk to data for four subgroups in India: 
forward-caste Hindus; Hindus from the Other Backward Classes; Dalits (collectively the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes); and Muslims.  We show that, on both measures of 
risk, forward caste Hindus do best in the Indian labour market. This is partly due to their 
superior labour market attributes and partly due to their better access to good jobs.  When 
inter-group differences in attributes are neutralised, the favourable labour market 
performance of forward caste Hindus is considerably reduced.  We conclude that it is the lack 
of attributes necessary for, rather than lack of access to, regular employment that holds back 
India‟s deprived groups.  
 
Keywords: Labour Market; Risk Ratio; India; Caste; Religion.  
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On the Risk Associated With Belonging to Disadvantaged 
Groups: A Bayesian Analysis with an Application to Labour 
Market Outcomes in India 
 
1.  Introduction 
 The concepts and ideas found in Bayes‟ Theorem encapsulated in equation 1 (See 
technical note below) to construct two concepts of the “risk” associated with belonging to a 
particular group in terms of the favourable labour market outcome.  The first concept, the 
Employment Risk Ratio, measures the odds of a person being in regular employment to being 
in non-regular employment, given that he belongs to a particular group.  The second, the 
Group Risk Ratio, measures the odds of a person being in regular employment, given that he 
belongs to one group against belonging to another group. These concepts of risk are applied 
to data for four subgroups in India: forward-caste Hindus (ie. Hindus belonging to the 
Brahmin, Kshatriya, and Bania “castes”); Hindus from the Other Backward Classes (OBC)1; 
Dalits (the Scheduled Castes); and the Scheduled Tribes; and Muslims.  Dalits and Muslims 
are the least privileged groups, and forward-caste Hindus the most privileged group, in India 
with Hindus from the OBC occupying an intermediate position.   
 
 However, under the Indian Constitution, Dalits are protected by affirmative action in 
jobs (“jobs reservation”), education, and representation on elected bodies while Muslims are 
not.  Affirmative action for Dalits was intended to assist groups who had known centuries of 
suppression while, for the Scheduled Tribes, it was intended to assist groups who were 
traditionally isolated from the modern world and from mainstream society.
2
  
 
We use our concepts of risk to assess the extent to which the low representation of 
India‟s deprived groups in regular employment can be attributed to their low educational 
qualifications (“attribute disadvantage”) and the extent to which it emanates from their lack 
of access to such employment (“access disadvantage”).  The topic of minority disadvantage 
in the Indian labour market has always been a contentious issue in India but it has received 
new impetus through the publication of the Indian Cabinet Secretariat‟s Report on the social, 
economic and educational status of Muslims in India (Cabinet Secretariat, 2006). On the 
                                                 
1
 These are Hindus belonging to the Sudra “caste”, the lowest caste within the ambit of the caste system.  
2
 For the history and evolution of caste-based preferential policies in India see Osborne (2001). 
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basis of this report, the Prime Minister of India has made a case for Dalits and Muslims 
having first claim on national resources.
3
 
 
The NSS employment and unemployment data give the distribution of its respondents - 
who are distinguished by various characteristics, including their caste, religion, and 
educational standard - between different categories of economic status.  Of these categories, 
the three which are the most important are: self-employed; regular salaried or wage 
employees; and casual wage labourers.  Using these data,  we focused on prime-age (25-45 
years of age) males and estimated, using the methods of multinomial logit, the probabilities 
of men being in these categories of employment, after controlling for their caste/religion
4
 and 
their employment-related attributes.
5
   
 
These probabilities were then used to decompose the difference between "group X" and 
forward caste Hindus in the proportions of their members in regular salaried or wage 
employment.
6
  This decomposition allowed us to assign a proportion of this (overall) 
difference to “attribute differences” between the group X and forward caste Hindus – i.e. the 
outcome difference when the different attributes of group X and forward caste Hindus were 
evaluated using a common coefficient vector
7
 ; the rest of the overall difference was then due 
to “coefficient differences” i.e. the outcome difference in when the attributes of group X  
were evaluated, first using the coefficient vector of group X and, then, using the coefficient 
vector of forward caste Hindus.
8
 The proportionate contributions of the attributes and the 
coefficients differences, to the overall difference, are termed, respectively, the attributes 
contribution and the coefficients contribution.  
 
                                                 
3
 Speech to the National Development Council, 9
th
 December 2006. 
  http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id=464 
4
 The caste/religion groups considered are: ST (Christian); ST (non-Christian); SC; OBC (Muslim); OBC (non-
Muslim); forward caste Hindus (non-OBC/SC/ST Hindus); Muslims (non-OBC/SC/ST);  Christian (non-
OBC/SC/ST); Sikhs (non-OBC/SC/ST). 
5
 The choice of prime-age males was influenced by the fact that very large proportion of these men were likely 
to be active in the labour market in the sense of  being either employed or seeking employment. 
6
 forward caste Hindus were Hindus who were not included in the OBC/SC/ST categories. However, since the 
designation of groups in the OBC category is a state responsibility a particular (caste) group may be included in 
the OBC category in one state (i.e. be excluded from  forward caste Hindus) but be excluded from the OBC 
category in another state (i.e. be included in  forward caste Hindus).  
7
 Which could be the coefficient vector of either group X or forward caste Hindus. 
8
  Alternatively, the attributes of forward caste Hindus could be evaluated, first using the coefficient vector of 
group X and, then, using the coefficient vector of forward caste Hindus. 
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We can compute the proportion of the (overall) difference between forward caste Hindus 
and persons in group X, in the proportions of their members in regular salaried and wage 
employment, which is due to “coefficient differences” (the coefficients contribution). This 
proportion  may be interpreted as a measure of “discrimination” against, or for, persons from 
group X.   
 
If  this difference is positive – the proportion of persons in regular salaried and wage 
employment is higher when the attributes of group X are evaluated using its own coefficients 
than the coefficients of forward caste Hindus – then discrimination works in favour of group 
X;  on the other hand,  if this difference is negative – the proportion of persons in regular 
salaried and wage employment is smaller when the attributes of group X are evaluated using 
its own coefficients than the coefficients of forward caste Hindus – then discrimination works 
against group X.  Given that employers might be expected to have a preference for 
employing forward caste Hindus, compared to persons from the SC or the ST,
9
 jobs 
reservation policies in favour of applicants from the SC and ST might be expected to blunt 
discrimination against SC/ST applicants and, possibly, even reverse it. 
 
This method of measuring discrimination for or against persons from group X, described 
above, needs to be qualified in, at least, three respects.  First, note that discrimination is 
computed conditional upon a given set of attributes.  If these attributes are added to, or 
subtracted from, then the degree of discrimination would also change.  For example, if better 
data on educational qualifications became available, then the degree of discrimination 
computed from the new data would be different from the original estimate.  So, there is no 
unique degree of discrimination. 
 
Second, even if one could establish a definitive vector of relevant attributes, an unique 
degree of discrimination might still not be established.  This is because the attributes 
contribution could be computed using either the coefficients of group X or the coefficients of 
forward caste Hindus and the two methods may not yield the same result.  There is nothing in 
the methodology to suggest that one computation is to be preferred over the other.  
Consequently, the coefficients difference – computed as the difference between the overall 
difference and the contribution of attributes difference - would be different depending upon 
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how the attributes contribution was computed.
10
  Also for this reason, there may be no unique 
degree of discrimination. 
 
Third, the methodology assumes a one-way relation between attributes and employment 
outcomes.  For example, exogenously given high (low) educational qualifications are likely 
to lead to good (bad) employment outcomes.  This assumed exogeneity of qualifications 
might be justified at a point in time but, with a broader time frame, it is plausible that past 
good/bad employment outcomes in the past contribute to present high/low educational 
qualifications. In other words, there is a two-way relation between qualifications and 
employment outcomes: qualifications influence employment outcomes but employment 
outcomes also influence qualifications. 
 
To put it differently, the degree of discrimination as measured by our methodology 
measures discrimination at a point in time, conditional on a given set of attributes.  But the 
poor attributes of the members of a group may be the result of past discrimination against 
such persons: the fact that members of a group were denied good jobs in the past was a 
barrier to their acquiring good educational qualifications and this resulted in their inability to 
secure good jobs today.  Consequently, it needs to be emphasised that the degree of 
discrimination measured in this study will necessarily understate the “true” (i.e. historical), 
but unknown, degree of discrimination. 
 
Two final points may be made. First, a person may be discouraged from applying for 
a particular type of job if he feels that applications from members of his group are treated 
unfavourably compared to applications from members of other groups. This “discouraged 
applicant” effect as it pertains to certain groups cannot be observed.  Second, the category 
“regular salaried and wage employment” is a broad one encompassing low status/poorly paid 
to high status/well paid jobs. We are unable, given the data, to break such employment into 
different types of jobs but it is very possible that a further type of discrimination is that, for 
some groups, the access of its members to “regular salaried and wage employment” is largely 
confined to the lower end of the spectrum of such jobs. 
                                                                                                                                                        
9
 This preference might be engendered by a distaste for persons from such groups (bigotry: Becker, 1971) or by 
a belief that employees from such groups were inferior workers (statistical discrimination: Phelps, 1972). 
10
 An equivalent way of expressing is that the coefficient difference may be computed either by evaluating the 
attributes of group X or by evaluating  the attributes of forward caste Hindus using the two different coefficient 
vectors.  
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2.  Empirical Background  
 The relevant data are from the 55
th
 round (1999-2000) of the National Sample Survey 
(NSS) for India.  The NSS employment and unemployment data give the distribution of its 
respondents - who are distinguished by various characteristics, including their caste, religion, 
and educational standard - between different categories of economic status.  In this study we 
focus on the 73,789 Hindu and Muslim respondents, living in the 16 major states of India and 
the Union Territory of Delhi, who were prime-age (25-45 years of age) males.  A large 
proportion of these men were likely to be active in the labour market i.e. either employed or 
seeking employment.  Amongst Hindus, we drew a distinction between forward caste (FC) 
Hindus, Hindus from the Other Backward Classes (OBC), and Dalits.   
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of these men, by their educational standard, between the 
following categories of economic status
11
: 
1. Own account workers (self-employed) 
2. Unpaid family workers 
3. Regular salaried or wage workers 
4. Casual wage worker 
5. Employers 
6. Seeking and/or available for work 
 
Of these six categories, the first four were the main categories of economic status for 
prime-age men: 28,470 of the 73,789 men (39 percent) were self employed; 16,379 men 
(22 percent of the total) were regular salaried or wage workers; 18,451 men (25 percent of 
the total) were casual labourers; and 7,988 men (11 percent of the total) were unpaid 
family workers.   
 
Being a casual wage worker or self employed was largely the preserve of poorly educated 
men while those in regular employment were largely drawn from the ranks of the better 
educated men: half of the 18,451 prime-age men who were casual wage workers were 
illiterate and, of those who were literate, nearly all had an education standard less than 
secondary school; of the 28,470 men who were own account workers, one-fourth were 
illiterate  and, of those that were literate, nearly 90 percent had an education standard less 
than secondary school;  on the other hand, of the 16,379 prime-age men who were regular 
                                                 
11
 Excluded from this analysis were 2,359 prime-age males who were: attending educational institutions (655 
men); attending domestic duties, and/or producing goods and services for household use (for example, serving, 
tailoring, weaving), and/or engaged in free collection of goods - for example, vegetables, roots, firewood, cattle 
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salaried or wage workers, 61 percent were educated to secondary (or above) and 27 percent 
of the 16,379 workers were graduates (or above).   A striking feature of Table 1 is how few 
men were seeking, and/or available for, work: only 1,553 men (2 percent of the total) were 
unemployed in the conventional meaning of the term.  Moreover, job search appeared to be 
the prerogative of better educated men: of the 1,553 "unemployed" men, 76 percent were 
educated to secondary level or above and 41 percent were graduates or postgraduates. 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of prime-age men across the categories of economic status 
by religion and caste.  Table 2 clearly shows that Hindu OBC prime-age males were different 
from Dalits in two important respects.  First, Hindu OBC men were more likely to be in self 
employment (41 percent) than Dalits (30 percent).  Second, Hindu OBC men were less likely 
to work as casual labourers (25 percent) than Dalits (45 percent).  Prime-age Hindu males 
from the OBC also differed from their FC Hindu counterparts in two important respects.  
First, FC Hindu men were more likely to be in regular employment (32 percent) than Hindu 
OBC men (19 percent).  Second, FC Hindu men were even less likely (10 percent) to work as 
casual labourers than Hindu men from the OBC.  
 
Lastly, 46 percent of Muslims were self employed, 24 percent worked as casual wage 
workers, and 18 percent were regular salaried or wage workers.  Thus the labour market 
position of prime-aged Muslim men was very similar to that of Hindus from the OBC. 
Consequently, if one was to establish a hierarchy of communities in terms of the 
"desirability" of the economic status of their prime-age men then, undoubtedly, Dalits, a large 
proportion of whose (prime age) men were casual wage workers, would lie at the bottom; FC 
Hindus, with one third of their men in regular employment, and only one tenth of their men 
working for casual wages, would be at the top; and sandwiched between them would be 
Hindus from the OBC and Muslims. 
 
This study implicitly assumes that becoming a regular salaried or wage worker was the 
most desirable outcome for prime-aged men and, compared to that, self employment or 
casual wage labour were inferior outcomes.  One can cite many justifications for this 
assumption.  First, as referred to already, the Prime Minister of India has set up a high-
powered committee to look at minority employment and, in particular, to examine why 
Muslims comprise only a fraction of India‟s workforce.  Second, this assumption is  also 
                                                                                                                                                        
feed (310 men); rentiers, pensioners, and remittance recipients (175 men); unable to work owing to a disability 
(448 men); beggars and prostitutes (42 men); and "others" (729 men). 
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consistent with evidence from the field: for example, Jeffery and Jeffery (1997) argued that 
many Muslims regarded their relative economic weakness as stemming from anti-Muslim 
discriminatory practices in hiring. The belief that their sons would not get jobs then led 
Muslim parents to devalue the importance of education as an instrument of upward economic 
mobility.
12
  
Lastly, Table 3 shows the education standards of prime-age men from the different 
communities.  Dalits had, by far, the lowest level of educational achievement: 44 percent of 
prime-age Dalit men were illiterate.  They were followed by Muslims and Hindus from the 
OBC: 31 percent of Muslim men and 27 percent of Hindu OBC men were illiterate.  The best 
educated men were FC Hindus: only 10 percent of FC Hindu men were illiterate and 24 
percent of them were graduates. 
 
3.  Empirical Analysis: The Group Risk Ratio and the Group Bayes Factor  
Table 4 presents estimates of the upper-triangle of the matrix of Group Risk Ratios 
(GRR), for regular salaried and wage employment, for the total of 63,300 prime age men 
(hereafter, simply “men”) from four groups: FC Hindus (19,190), Hindus from the OBC 
(20,082), Muslims (7,997), and Dalits (16,031).  The values of the unadjusted GRR, shown in 
the top panel of Table 4, were calculated from the sample data and show that the proportion 
of FC Hindu men in regular employment (38.7 percent) was: 1.74 times the proportion of 
Hindu men from the OBC in regular employment (22.3 percent); 1.85 times that of Muslim 
men (20.9 percent); and 2.21 times that of Dalit men (17.5 percent). 
 
One reason why there might be differences between the groups in the proportions of 
their men in regular employment, P(R|X), is because of inter-group differences in the 
distribution of attributes relevant for regular employment.  For example, since half of all male 
graduates were in regular employment (Table 1) and since 24 percent of FC Hindu men, but 
only 5 percent of Dalit men, were graduates (Table 3) then, compared to FC Hindus, one 
would expect to see a (considerably) smaller proportion of Dalits in regular employment.  A 
second reason for the unequal representation of groups in regular employment is that persons 
from some groups may have better access to such employment than those from other groups.  
For example, a graduate who is a FC Hindu may find it much easier to find employment than 
a Dalit graduate; consequently, even without inter-group differences in attributes, there may 
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 However, there may be cases where self employment is the preferred outcome over the available choices.  We 
are unable to take account of such preferences because all we observe is the outcome and not the reasons for the 
outcome. 
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be marked differences between the groups in their representation among those in regular 
employment. The numbers under the “unadjusted” rubric result from the combined influence 
of inter-group differences in attributes and access.  
 
The adjusted GRR, shown in the lower panels of Table 4, are the result of neutralising 
inter-group differences in attributes.  In order to eliminate attribute differences, we 
constructed an “equal attributes” scenario:  
(i) Inter-group differences in land holdings were eliminated by assuming that 
everyone was landless.   
(ii) Inter-group age differences were eliminated by assuming that everyone was in the 
25-30 years age bracket.   
(iii) Inter-group differences in the state of residence were eliminated by assuming that 
everyone lived in the default state, Tamil Nadu. 
(iv) Inter-group sectoral differences were eliminated by assuming that everyone 
worked in the urban sector.  
 
Then, under this umbrella of uniformity - (i)-(iv), above - we assumed that all the 
individuals in the sample had the same level of education at, successively, lower levels:  
(a) Everyone was a graduate.  
(b) Everyone was educated up to secondary level. 
(c)  Everyone was educated to above primary, but below secondary, level. 
(d) Everyone was literate, but all had below primary level education. 
 
Lastly, we estimated a multinomial logit model in which the dependent variable Yi 
took the values, 1, 2, or 3, depending upon whether person i was self employed; a regular 
salaried or wage worker; a casual wage labourer (63,300 observations): 
 
Pr( )
(landholding, social group, education, state, sector)
Pr( 1)
i
i
Y j
f
Y



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These multinomial estimates are shown in Table A of the Appendix, with self 
employment as the base, or reference, category.
 13
   These estimates were used to predict 
the average probabilities of persons in the four different groups being in regular 
employment – P(R|X), X=H, O, M, D – under four different scenarios: (i)-(iv) plus (a); 
(i)-(iv) plus (b); (i)-(iv) plus (c); (i)-(iv) plus (d).  The GRR implied by the predicted 
probabilities are shown in the lower panels of Table 4, prefaced by the term “adjusted”. 
 
As observed earlier, the values for the different groups of their unadjusted GRR are 
the result of two forces: inter-group differences in attributes and inter-group differences in 
access to regular employment.   On the other hand, the values of the adjusted GRR were 
obtained by eliminating differences in attributes between the groups: consequently, inter-
group differences in the values of adjusted GRR are a reflection solely of differences 
between the groups in their access to regular employment. 
 
As a consequence, the values of adjusted GRR – of FC Hindus over the three other 
groups – for regular employment were always lower than the corresponding unadjusted 
values: once the attributes advantage that FC Hindus enjoyed over the other groups (see 
Table 3) were neutralised, the odds of being in regular employment of Hindu men to men 
from other groups was predicted to be (considerably) lower than the odds computed from 
the sample averages.  
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 With J mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive outcomes, indexed 1…J,  the multinomial logit model 
is defined by a pair of equations.  The first, defines the log odds ratio of a person i  being in status  j>1, relative 
to being in the „base‟ status  j=1, as a linear function of { ,  1... }ikX k K iX , the vector of values of K 
explanatory variables ( 1 1iX  ) for the person: 
1
Pr( )
log
Pr( 1)
K
i
jk ik
ki
Y j
X
Y


 
  
 
 i jX β  where: Yi is an integer 
variable which takes the value j if, and only if, outcome j occurs for person i, and jβ is the vector of coefficients 
associated with outcome j, 1j  being the coefficient associated with the intercept term.  The second equation 
defines the probability  of outcome j (j=1…J) occurring for individual i 
as:
1
Pr( ) exp( ) /[1 ] ( )
J
i ij ir
r
Y j Z Z F

    i jX β . The coefficient estimates are to be interpreted as the change in 
the log odds-ratios, consequent upon a unit change in the value of the associated variable: 
Pr( )
log
Pr( 1)
i
jk
ik i
Y j
X Y

 
  
  
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Within the context of the adjusted GRR values – of FC Hindus over the three other groups 
– for regular employment, these were lowest when it was assumed that all the men were 
graduates (i.e. scenario (i)-(iv) plus (a)) and they increased as the common level of 
education was reduced.  The quality of jobs which offered regular employment was likely 
to be low if applicants had poor educational levels: for example, a government 
department might appoint graduates to officer level positions but offer more lowly jobs to 
those who failed to complete school.  Consequently, attributes, and probity in selection 
procedures, were likely to be relatively less important than access in getting regular 
employment in “low-status”, compared to “high status”, jobs.  Indeed, because of the 
Indian government‟s affirmative action policies in favour of Dalits, the adjusted GRR 
values of FC Hindus over Dalits, for regular employment, was, under the “all men are 
graduates” scenario less than 1 or, equivalently, the probability of Hindu graduates being 
in regular employment was lower than that of Dalit graduates. 
 
The Group Bayes Factor (GBF) values represent the odds of a person, who is in 
regular employment, belonging to one group over belonging to another group.  As 
equation (3) of technical note 2 shows, the GBF values are obtained from the GRR by 
multiplying the latter by the total numbers in one group over the other.  Consequently, if 
NX and NY are the numbers in two groups X and Y,  if 
R R
XY XY X YN N   .   
 
Since the number of FC Hindus in the sample (19,190) was greater than the number of 
Dalits (16,031) and Muslims (7997), the odds of a person in regular employment being a 
FC Hindu rather than a Dalit or a Muslim (unadjusted GBF was 2.65 for Dalits and 4.44 
for Muslims) were greater than the odds of a Hindu to a Dalit, or a Muslim, being in 
regular employment (Table 4: unadjusted GRR was 2.21 for Dalits and 1.85 for Muslims).   
 
Conversely, since the sample had more Hindus from the OBC (20,082) than FC 
Hindus (19,190), the odds of a person in regular employment being a FC, rather than an 
Other Backward Classes, Hindu (unadjusted GBF was 1.67) was smaller than the odds of 
a FC to a OBC Hindu being in regular employment (Table 4: unadjusted GRR was 1.74 
for Hindus from the Other Backward Classes).                   
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4.  Empirical analysis: The Employment Risk Ratios and the Employment 
Bayes Factors 
In the empirical analysis of the Employment Bayes Factors (EBF) and the 
Employment Risk Ratios (ERR), described in section 3 above, we focused on the three main 
employment categories: regular salaried or wage employment (16,379 men); self employment 
(28,470 men); and casual wage employment (18,451 men).
14
  This yielded a total of 63,300 
prime-age men.  All those who were self employed or who were casual wage employees were 
regarded as being in non-regular employment.  The values of the EBF and the ERR are shown 
in Table 5 for each of the four social groups: FC Hindus, Hindus from the OBC, Muslims, 
and Dalits. 
 
The first set of figures in Table 5, under the heading “unadjusted”, shows the values 
of ( | ) and ( | )P X R P X C , calculated as the sample proportions of persons in regular and non-
regular employment who belonged to group X.  Of the 16,739 men in regular employment: 
45 percent were FC Hindus, 27 percent were Hindus from the OBC, 17 percent were Dalits, 
and 10 percent were Muslims.  Of the 46,921 men in non-regular employment: 25 percent 
were FC Hindus, 33 percent were Hindus from the OBC, 28 percent were Dalits, and 13 
percent were Muslims. On these “unadjusted” probabilities of belonging to a group, 
conditional on being in regular employment /being in non-regular employment, the EBF 
(equation (2) of technical note 2) was 0.55 for FC Hindus, 1.22 for Hindus from the OBC, 
1.32 for Muslims, and 1.64 for Dalits. 
 
This means that a man was less likely, by a factor of 0.55, to be a FC Hindu if he was 
in non-regular employment than if he was in regular employment.  On the other hand, the 
Bayes Factor for the other groups was greater than unity and was highest for Dalits: a man 
was more likely to be a Dalit, by a factor of 1.64, if he was in non-regular employment than if 
he was in regular employment .    
 
    
 
 
                                                 
14
 Excluded from the analysis were men who were: in unpaid family employment (7,988 men); employers (948 
men); seeking work (1,553 men). 
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The ratio of those in non-regular employment (16,379) to those in regular employment 
(46,921) was 2.87 (i.e. ( ) / ( ) 2.87P C P R  ), yielding a ERR value (equation (2)) of 1.58 for 
FC Hindus, 3.50 for Hindus from the OBC, 3.78 for Muslims, and 4.70 for Dalits.  This 
means that the probability of a FC Hindu male being in non-regular employment was 1.58 
times more than the probability of him being in regular employment.  The ERR was highest 
for Dalits: the probability of  a Dalit male being in non-regular employment was as much as 
4.7 times more than the probability of him being in regular employment.  
 
 As discussed earlier, the unequal representation of the different groups in the ranks of 
those in regular employment stems from differences between the groups in the attributes 
relevant for such employment and from inter-group differences in access to such 
employment.  For example, if 27 percent of those in regular employment are graduates (Table 
1) and 62 percent of graduates are Hindus, but only 9 percent of graduates are Dalits (Table 
3) then one would expect to see a larger proportion of Hindus than Dalits among those in 
regular employment.  The numbers under the “unadjusted” rubric represent inter-group 
differences emanating from both these sources. 
 
The next set of calculations in Table 5 (i.e. those headed “adjusted”) show the EBF 
and ERR values after differences in attributes between the individuals in the different groups 
had been eliminated using the methodology described in the previous section.  The estimates 
from a multinomial logit model (shown in Table B of the Appendix) - whose dependent 
variable Yi took one of the values 1, 2,  3 or 4 depending upon whether person i was a FC 
Hindu, a Hindu from the OBC, a Dalit, or a Muslim - were used to predict the average 
probabilities, of persons in regular employment, of belonging to the different groups under 
the four scenarios, described in the preceding section: (i)-(iv) plus (a); (i)-(iv) plus (b); (i)-(iv) 
plus (c); (i)-(iv) plus (d).     
 
Under uniformity of attributes, the ERR for Hindus rose from 1.58 (unadjusted) to 
2.61 (adjusted, “all graduates”).  In other words, if it was assumed that all the men were 
graduates, the probability of a FC Hindu male being in non-regular employment rose from 
1.58 times, to 2.61 times, of the probability of him being in regular employment.  Paralleling 
this rise, the ERR for Hindus from the OBC fell from 3.5 to 2.92; for Muslims it fell from 
3.78 to 3.67; and for Dalits, it fell from 4.7 to 2.75.   
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 These changes from the unadjusted to the adjusted ERR reveal many interesting 
features of the Indian labour market.  First, as Table 2 shows, FC Hindu men enjoyed a 
tremendous educational advantage over men from the other groups.  This resulted in the 
unadjusted ERR of FC Hindu men being less than half that of Hindus from the OBC and of 
Muslims, and less than one-third that of Dalits.  When differences in education between FC 
Hindus and the other groups were neutralised, the differences in the ERR values were 
appreciably reduced. Now, the only advantage that FC Hindus had was better access to 
regular employment.  However, jobs reservation in favour of Dalits served to blunt the 
“access advantage” of FC Hindus: in consequence, once education differences were 
neutralised, there was not much difference in their ERR values between FC Hindus and 
Dalits. 
 Neutralising inter-group educational differences affected the ERR of Muslims the 
least: the unadjusted ERR fell from its unadjusted value of 3.78 to around 3.66.  A large part 
of Muslim disadvantage in the jobs market stems from the difficulty that Muslims have in 
finding regular employment (“access disadvantage”).  For example, Jeffery and Jeffery 
(1997) in their study of Muslims in Bijnor argued that many Muslims regarded their relative 
economic weakness as stemming from their being excluded from jobs due to discriminatory 
practices in hiring. The belief that their sons would not get jobs then led Muslim parents to 
devalue the importance of education as an instrument of upward economic mobility.  
However, unlike Dalits, Muslims are not protected by jobs reservation.  Consequently, even 
after abstracting from their low education levels, compared to FC Hindus, Muslims still 
suffered from considerable access disadvantage in terms of obtaining regular employment.   
 
5. Access versus Attributes: An Assessment of the Social Groups in Terms of Their 
Outcomes for Regular Employment  
 
Intuitively, the ratio of the unadjusted and the adjusted values of the Group Risk 
Ratios (GRR), of FC Hindus to, say, Dalits, is a measure of the attribute advantage of FC 
Hindus over Dalits, if this exceeds 1, i.e. the unadjusted GRR is greater than the adjusted 
GRR - or disadvantage, if this is less than 1, i.e. the unadjusted GRR is less than the adjusted 
GRR - in terms of securing regular employment.  Then the percentage contributions made to 
the unadjusted Hindu-Dalit GRR by the attributes and access advantages of FC Hindus over 
Dalits are computed.  
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    The first row of Table 6 shows the unadjusted GRR of FC Hindus to the three other groups: 
Hindus from the OBC, Muslims, and Dalits.  When assumptions (i)-(iv) of the attribute 
equalising scenario, detailed in section 3, were applied in conjunction with the assumption 
that everyone was a graduate, the GRR values of the groups fell to 1.01, 1.06, and 0.98 for, 
respectively, Hindus from the OBC, Muslims, and Dalits.  From this we conclude that 98 
percent of the unadjusted GRR of FC Hindus to Hindus from the OBC was due to attributes 
advantage and only 2 percent was due to access advantage; of the unadjusted GRR of FC 
Hindus to Muslims, 90 percent was due to attributes advantage and 10 percent was due to 
access advantage;
 15
 attributes advantage contributed entirely to the unadjusted GRR of FC 
Hindus to Dalits.
 16
       
 As the common educational standard in the simulations was lowered, the advantage of 
FC Hindus over the other groups was reduced:  for example, as Table 3 shows, 32 percent of 
FC Hindus – compared to 12 percent of Dalits, 17 percent of Muslims, and 21 percent of 
Hindus from the OBC – were educated up to secondary level.  When this advantage was 
neutralised by assuming that all prime age men were educated up to secondary level, men 
from the other groups did not benefit by as much, in terms of their probabilities of being in 
regular employment, as they had in the earlier simulation in which it was assumed that all 
prime age men were graduates.   
 
Similarly, when the attributes advantage of FC Hindus was neutralised by assuming 
that all prime age men were educated up to middle school level, men from the other groups 
did not benefit by as much, in terms of their probabilities of being in regular employment, as 
they had in the earlier simulation in which it was assumed that all prime age men were 
educated up to secondary level. Consequently, as Table 6 illustrates, the importance of access 
to regular employment increased, and the importance of possessing the attributes needed for 
regular employment decreased, as the common educational threshold was lowered. 
 
                                                 
15
 The fact that Hindus have access advantage to regular employment over Muslims is evidenced by the fact that 
even when attributes between prime age men in the two groups are equalised, with all being assumed to be 
graduates, the predicted probability of Muslims being in regular employment ( ( | ) 0.797P R M  ) is less than 
that of Hindus ( ( | ) 0.849P R H  ). 
16
 The fact that Hindus have access disadvantage to regular employment over Dalits is evidenced by the fact that 
even when attributes between prime age men in the two groups are equalised, with all being assumed to be 
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6.  Conclusions               
  This paper argues that participation in regular employment across different social 
groups is determined by the relative advantage of groups in terms of “attributes” (e.g., 
educational attainment) and “access” (e.g., reservation for specific groups). It first develops 
two concepts of “risk”, namely, the Employment Risk Ratio, measured the odds of a person 
being in regular employment to being in non-regular employment, given that he belongs to a 
particular group; and the Group Risk Ratio, measured the odds of a person being in regular 
employment, given that he belonged to one group against belonging to another group.  
 
These concepts of risk were then applied to data for four subgroups in India: forward-
caste Hindus, Hindus from the Other Backward Classes, Muslims, and Dalits (collectively 
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes); this showed that, on both measures of risk, FC 
Hindus did best in the Indian labour market. A decomposition of the effects suggested that 
their superior labour market attributes were partly due to the relatively large number of FC 
Hindus who were graduates; partly also due to their better access to jobs offering regular 
employment.   
 
When inter-group differences in attributes were neutralised, the favourable labour 
market performance of FC Hindus was considerably reduced.  The conclusion of this study is 
that it is the lack of attributes necessary for, rather than lack of access to, regular employment 
that holds back India‟s deprived groups.  However, to date, the Indian government‟s jobs 
reservation policies has placed little emphasis on improving job-related attributes but, 
instead, has focused almost entirely on improving access.  This paper has drawn attention to 
another prong of policy which is to improve the educational standards of Dalits and Muslims 
especially by improving job-related attributes through education and skill formation and 
concurrently imporove access to regular employment through fair financial allocations and 
leagal backing if necessary.    
 
The second conclusion of this study is that, compared to FC Hindus, Muslims – who, 
unlike Dalits, are not protected by jobs reservation - suffered from considerable access 
disadvantage in terms of obtaining regular employment, even after abstracting from their low 
                                                                                                                                                        
graduates, the predicted probability of Dalits being in regular employment ( ( | ) 0.870P R D  ) is higher than 
that of Hindus ( ( | ) 0.849P R H  ). 
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education levels.  Indeed, compared to FC Hindus, the access disadvantage of Muslims was 
considerably higher than that of the Hindu OBC.  So, if the object of jobs reservation is to 
correct for discriminatory bias in the jobs market, and if reservation is to be extended beyond 
Dalits, then Muslims have a more compelling case than the Hindu OBC! 
 
The third and perhaps most important conclusion of this study is – as the more patient 
readers of this chapter will, undoubtedly, have already inferred – that the subject of jobs 
reservation in India is a complex one, requiring a careful, detailed, and painstaking analysis 
of the available data.  However, too often, in the Indian context, the opposite is the case: the 
rhetoric underpinning the discussion of jobs reservation is often shrill and recriminatory and 
the actions accompanying these ill-tempered words are usually retributive and violent.  If this 
paper has any message then it is that this course of action is sterile and unproductive at best 
and, at worst, destructive of self, society, and country.       
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Table 1 
Economic Status and Educational Standards of Men between 25 and 45 years of age (1999-00) 
 Illiterate Literate, but 
below 
primary 
Primary or 
Middle School  
Secondary 
School 
Graduate Total 
       
SE 7,094 3,399 9,148 6,125 2,704 28,470  
 24.92 11.94 32.13 21.51 9.50 100.00  
 37.17 41.44 42.94 37.97 29.82 38.58  
       
EMP 74 62 300 318 194 948  
 7.81 6.54 31.65 33.54 20.46 100.00  
 0.39 0.76 1.41 1.97 2.14 1.28  
       
UFW 1,424 688 2,635 2,339 902 7,988  
 17.83 8.61 32.99 29.28 11.29 100.00  
 7.46 8.39 12.37 14.50 9.95 10.83  
       
RSWE 1,316 1,053 4,046 5,469 4,495 16,379  
 8.03 6.43 24.70 33.39 27.44 100.00  
 6.90 12.84 18.99 33.90 49.56 22.20  
       
CWW 9,136 2,950 4,896 1,329 140 18,451  
 49.51 15.99 26.54 7.20 0.76 100.00  
 47.88 35.97 22.98 8.24 1.54 25.01  
       
SKW 39 50 278 552 634 1,553  
 2.51 3.22 17.90 35.54 40.82 100.00  
 0.20 0.61 1.30 3.42 6.99 2.10  
       
Total 19,083 8,202 21,303 16,132 9,069 73,789  
 25.86 11.12 28.87 21.86 12.29 100.00  
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Notes to Table 1: 
SE=self-employed; EMP=employer; RSWE=regular salaried or wage worker; CWW=casual wage worker; 
SKW=seeking work. 
First figure in column is total in caste/religion category; second figure is row percentage; third figure is column 
percentage. 
Source: NSS 55
th
 Round 
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Table 2 
Economic Status and Caste/Religion of Men between 25 and 45 years of age (1999-00) 
 Dalits Muslims Other 
Backward 
Classes 
Forward 
Caste Hindus 
Total 
SE 5,285 4,149 9,686 9,350 28,470  
 18.56 14.57 34.02 32.84 100.00  
 30.25 45.88 40.83 39.70 38.58  
      
EMP 59 137 301 451 948  
 6.22 14.45 31.75 47.57 100.00  
 0.34 1.51 1.27 1.91 1.28  
      
UFW 1,132 729 2,970 3,157 7,988  
 14.17 9.13 37.18 39.52 100.00  
 6.48 8.06 12.52 13.40 10.83  
      
RSWE 2,807 1,670 4,472 7,430 16,379  
 17.14 10.20 27.30 45.36 100.00  
 16.07 18.47 18.85 31.55 22.20  
      
CWW 7,939 2,178 5,924 2,410 18,451  
 43.03 11.80 32.11 13.06 100.00  
 45.44 24.08 24.97 10.23 25.01  
      
SKW 250 180 369 754 1,553  
 16.10 11.59 23.76 48.55 100.00  
 1.43 1.99 1.56 3.20 2.10  
      
Total 17,472 9,043 23,722 23,552 73,789  
 23.68 12.26 32.15 31.92 100.00  
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Notes to Table 2: 
SE=self-employed; EMP=employer; RSWE=regular salaried or wage worker; CWW=casual wage worker; 
SKW=seeking work. 
First figure in column is total in caste/religion category; second figure is row percentage; third figure is column 
percentage. 
Source: NSS 55
th
 Round  
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Table 3 
Education Standard and Caste/Religion of Men between 25 and 45 years of age (1999-00) 
 Dalits Muslims Other 
Backward 
Classes 
Forward 
Caste Hindus 
Total 
      
Illiterate 7,803 2,913 6,506 2,321 19,543  
 39.93 14.91 33.29 11.88 100.00  
 43.81 31.37 26.89 9.59 25.89  
      
Literate, but 
below 
primary 
2,437 1,341 2,851 1,696 8,325  
 29.27 16.11 34.25 20.37 100.00  
 13.68 14.44 11.78 7.01 11.03  
      
Primary or 
Middle 
School 
4,556 2,842 7,741 6,530 21,669  
 21.03 13.12 35.72 30.14 100.00  
 25.58 30.61 32.00 26.98 28.70  
      
Secondary 
School 
2,165 1,541 5,049 7,779 16,534  
 13.09 9.32 30.54 47.05 100.00  
 12.15 16.59 20.87 32.14 21.90  
      
Graduate 852 649 2,046 5,877 9,424  
 9.04 6.89 21.71 62.36 100.00  
 4.78 6.99 8.46 24.28 12.48  
      
Total 17,813 9,286 24,193 24,203 75,495  
 23.59 12.30 32.05 32.06 100.00  
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 Source: NSS 55
th
 Round 
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Table 4 
Group Risk Ratios for Regular Salaried and Wage Employment 
 Unadjusted Group Risk Ratios 
 Forward Caste 
Hindus 
Hindus from the 
OBC 
Muslims Dalits 
Forward Caste 
Hindus 
1 1.74 1.85 2.21 
Hindus from the 
OBC 
 1 1.07 1.27 
Muslims 
 
  1 1.19 
Dalits 
 
   1 
 Adjusted Group Risk Ratios: all are graduates 
Forward Caste 
Hindus 
1 1.01 1.06 0.98 
Hindus from the 
OBC 
 1 1.05 0.96 
Muslims 
 
  1 0.92 
Dalits 
 
   1 
 Adjusted Group Risk Ratios: all have secondary education 
Forward Caste 
Hindus 
1 1.04 1.12 1.02 
Hindus from the 
OBC 
 1 1.08 0.98 
Muslims 
 
  1 0.91 
Dalits 
 
   1 
 Adjusted Group Risk Ratios: all have middle education 
Forward Caste 
Hindus 
1 1.10 1.21 1.14 
Hindus from the 
OBC 
 1 1.09 1.03 
Muslims 
 
  1 0.94 
Dalits 
 
   1 
 Adjusted Group Risk Ratios: all have below primary education 
Forward Caste 
Hindus 
1 1.16 1.25 1.26 
Hindus from the 
OBC 
 1 1.08 1.09 
Muslims 
 
  1 1.01 
Dalits 
 
   1 
Notes: 
R is regular salaried and wage employment; X and Y are groups. 
Group Risk Ratio = 
P(R|X)
P(R|Y)
 with group Y represented across the columns 
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Table 5 
Employment Bayes Factor (EBF) and Employment Risk Ratio (ERR) Calculations for Social Groups in 
India:  
Regular versus Non-Regular Employment 
 Forward 
Caste Hindus 
Hindus from 
OBC 
Muslims Dalits 
Unadjusted:     
P(group X |R) 45.36 27.30 10.20 17.14 
P(group X |C) 25.06 33.27 13.48 28.18 
EBF 0.55 1.22 1.32 1.64 
ERR 1.58 3.50 3.78 4.70 
Graduates:     
P(group X |R) 23.85 57.44 6.09 12.61 
P(group X |C) 21.71 58.35 7.85 12.09 
EBF 0.91 1.02 1.28 0.96 
ERR 2.61 2.92 3.67 2.75 
Secondary Education:     
P(group X |R) 14.25 64.83 6.83 14.09 
P(group X |C) 12.82 65.11 8.71 13.36 
EBF 0.90 1.01 1.28 0.95 
ERR 2.58 2.89 3.67 2.72 
Primary and above but 
below Secondary 
Education: 
    
P(group X |R) 8.09 65.40 8.22 18.28 
P(group X |C) 7.22 65.17 10.40 17.20 
EBF 0.89 1.00 1.27 0.94 
ERR 2.55 2.87 3.64 2.69 
Literate but Below 
Primary Education: 
    
P(group X |R) 5.43 61.35 10.82 22.39 
P(group X |C) 4.81 60.69 13.59 20.91 
EBF 0.88 0.99 1.25 0.93 
ERR 2.52 2.84 3.58 2.66 
Notes: 
R is regular salaried or wage employment. 
C is non-regular employment (self employment or casual wage employment). 
X is a group. 
Employment Bayes Factor (EBF) = 
P(X|C)
P(X|R)
 
Employment Risk Ratio (ERR) = 
P(C)
EBF×
1-P(C)
=
P(C|X)
P(R|X)
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Table 6 
The Contribution of Access and Attribute Advantage to the Group Risk Ratios of 
Forward Caste Hindus over other Groups 
 Group Risk Ratios 
 Hindus from 
OBC 
Muslims Dalits 
Unadjusted GRR 1.74 1.85 2.21 
Graduates:    
% contribution: Access Disadvantage 1.8 9.5 -5 
% contribution: Attributes 
Disadvantage 
98.2 90.5 105 
Secondary Education:    
% contribution: Access Disadvantage 7.1 18.4 2.5 
% contribution: Attributes 
Disadvantage 
92.9 81.6 97.5 
Primary and above but below 
Secondary Education: 
   
% contribution: Access Disadvantage 17.2 31.0 16.5 
% contribution: Attributes 
Disadvantage 
82.8 69 83.5 
Literate but Below Primary 
Education: 
   
% contribution: Access Disadvantage 26.8 36.3 29.1 
% contribution: Attributes 
Disadvantage 
73.2 63.7 70.9 
Notes: 
R is regular salaried and wage employment; X and Y are groups. 
Group Risk Ratio = 
P(R|X)
P(R|Y)
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 Appendix 
Multinomial Estimation Results 
 
Table A 
Multinomial Logit Estimates for Prime Age Males 
Dependent Variable is Employment Status 
 Regular Salaried or Wage 
Workers 
Casual Wage Labour 
Land-ownership 
(default: no land) 
  
Land owner: < 0.22 hectares -0.665*** 0.022 
 (24.21) (0.70) 
Land owner: 0.22-1.13 hectares -1.381*** -1.056*** 
 (33.30) (27.66) 
Land Land owner: > 1.13 
hectares 
-1.787*** -2.774*** 
 (41.37) (53.40) 
Age  
(default:25-30 years) 
  
Age: 30-35 years -0.109*** -0.425*** 
 (3.61) (14.49) 
Age: 36-40 years -0.056* -0.661*** 
 (1.86) (21.95) 
Age: 41-45 years 0.066** -0.782*** 
 (2.07) (23.84) 
Social Group (default: 
forward caste Hindus) 
  
Dalits 0.333*** 1.095*** 
 (9.96) (32.27) 
Muslims -0.352*** 0.004 
 (9.27) (0.09) 
Hindus from the OBC -0.039 0.354*** 
 (1.31) (10.46) 
Education 
(default: illiterate) 
  
Literate, below primary level 
schooling 
0.357*** -0.416*** 
 (7.33) (12.19) 
Primary or Middle level 
schooling 
0.624*** -0.849*** 
 (16.38) (29.89) 
Secondary or higher secondary 
level schooling 
1.287*** -1.594*** 
 (33.05) (40.80) 
Graduate 1.899*** -2.798*** 
 (43.72) (30.58) 
Sector (default: rural)   
Urban 0.512*** -1.099*** 
 (17.82) (38.59) 
States   
state1 -0.365*** -0.424*** 
 (6.52) (7.51) 
state2 -0.044 -0.878*** 
 (0.68) (13.17) 
state3 -1.039*** -0.654*** 
 (17.09) (12.14) 
state4 -0.343*** -0.033 
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 (5.55) (0.51) 
state5 -0.415*** -1.079*** 
 (4.94) (10.74) 
state6 0.141* -0.374*** 
 (1.73) (3.93) 
state7 -0.245*** 0.079 
 (3.83) (1.22) 
state8 -0.060 0.839*** 
 (0.79) (11.84) 
state9 -0.483*** -0.141** 
 (8.34) (2.49) 
state10 0.134** 0.030 
 (2.50) (0.51) 
state11 -0.261*** -0.317*** 
 (3.65) (4.81) 
state12 -0.205*** -1.126*** 
 (2.58) (11.29) 
state13 -0.383*** -1.019*** 
 (6.07) (14.68) 
state15 -0.809*** -1.216*** 
 (15.53) (22.74) 
state16 -0.672*** -0.642*** 
 (11.70) (11.13) 
state17 -0.169* -1.411*** 
 (1.94) (9.02) 
Constant -0.595*** 1.535*** 
 (8.98) (23.88) 
Observations 63300 63300 
Notes: 
Dependent variable =1, if man is self employed (base category); =2, if he is a regular salaried or wage worker; 
=3, if he is a casual wage labourer. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table B 
Multinomial Logit Estimates for Prime Age Males 
Dependent Variable is Group Membership 
 Dalit Equation Muslim 
Equation 
Hindus from OBC 
Equation 
Land-ownership 
(default: no land) 
   
Land owner: < 0.22 hectares 0.085*** 0.212*** 0.126*** 
 (2.61) (5.81) (4.10) 
Land owner: 0.22-1.13 hectares -0.261*** -0.469*** 0.115*** 
 (6.09) (8.81) (2.81) 
Land Land owner: > 1.13 hectares -1.004*** -0.930*** -0.264*** 
 (21.68) (15.61) (6.38) 
Age  
(default:25-30 years) 
   
Age: 30-35 years -0.206*** -0.200*** -0.101*** 
 (6.45) (5.26) (3.35) 
Age: 36-40 years -0.355*** -0.275*** -0.146*** 
 (10.91) (7.15) (4.78) 
Age: 41-45 years -0.421*** -0.366*** -0.234*** 
 (12.19) (8.91) (7.27) 
Education 
(default: illiterate) 
   
Literate, below primary level 
chooling 
-0.766*** -0.433*** -0.337*** 
 (17.47) (8.49) (7.56) 
Primary or Middle level schooling -1.367*** -1.106*** -0.672*** 
 (39.24) (26.77) (19.38) 
Secondary or higher secondary 
level schooling 
-2.194*** -1.857*** -1.246*** 
 (54.87) (39.45) (33.68) 
Graduate -2.819*** -2.487*** -1.882*** 
 (54.03) (41.24) (42.11) 
Sector (default: rural)    
Urban -0.980*** 0.180*** -0.589*** 
 (30.99) (4.95) (19.92) 
States    
state1 -1.390*** -0.706*** -1.772*** 
 (18.08) (7.62) (26.76) 
state2 -1.447*** 0.119 -2.909*** 
 (17.52) (1.27) (37.07) 
state3 -0.744*** -0.085 -1.251*** 
 (9.51) (0.90) (18.02) 
state4 -1.463*** -1.304*** -2.641*** 
 (18.54) (13.03) (37.13) 
state5 -2.183*** -2.568*** -3.037*** 
 (20.85) (14.56) (33.53) 
state6 -1.945*** -3.052*** -4.212*** 
 (20.23) (14.39) (36.71) 
state7 -1.453*** -0.748*** -2.333*** 
 (17.78) (7.70) (32.45) 
state8 -1.611*** 0.253** -1.738*** 
 (15.79) (2.50) (21.42) 
state9 -0.493*** -0.694*** -1.626*** 
 (6.50) (7.13) (23.86) 
state10 -1.665*** -0.907*** -2.650*** 
 (22.37) (10.21) (40.67) 
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state11 -0.989*** -2.620*** -2.347*** 
 (11.96) (15.99) (30.41) 
state12 -1.033*** -2.842*** -2.956*** 
 (10.91) (13.70) (29.77) 
state13 -1.032*** -0.952*** -2.266*** 
 (12.83) (9.20) (31.13) 
state15 -1.330*** -0.265*** -2.090*** 
 (18.45) (3.09) (33.02) 
state16 -1.755*** -0.857*** -4.270*** 
 (23.96) (9.82) (53.29) 
state17 -1.579*** -1.374*** -2.862*** 
 (13.44) (9.49) (26.18) 
Employment status (default:not 
in RSWE) 
   
RSWE -0.052* -0.349*** -0.110*** 
 (1.66) (9.48) (3.88) 
Constant 3.215*** 1.291*** 3.460*** 
 (42.10) (14.01) (49.57) 
Observations 63300 63300 63300 
Notes: 
Dependent variable =1, if man is Dalit; =2, if he is Muslim; =3, if he is Hindu from OBC; =4, if he is forward 
caste Hindu (base category) 
RSWE=regular salaried or wage employment 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
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Technical Note 1 : On Bayes’ Theorem 
The Reverend Thomas Bayes, an18
th
 century Presbyterian minister, proved what is, 
arguably, the most important theorem in statistics.
 17
  Bayes‟ Theorem  says that the 
probability of a theory being true (event T), given that the data has been observed (event A), 
is:  
 
( | )
( | ) ( )
( )
P A T
P T A P T
P A
   (1) 
where: ( )P T represents the prior belief that the theory is true and ( | ) / ( )P A T P A  is the 
Bayesian “updating factor” which translates one‟s prior belief about the theory‟s validity into 
a posterior belief.
18
 
 
 Bayes‟ theorem has been extensively applied in Law and in Medicine.  For example, 
in the area of Law it has shed light on the so-called “prosecutor‟s fallacy” whereby a 
prosecutor argues that since the probability of observing a particular piece of evidence (say, 
blood type identical to that found at the scene of the crime), under the assumed innocence of 
the defendant, is very small (that is, ( | )P A T is low), the probability of the defendant being 
innocent, given that his blood type matches that at the crime scene, must also be very small 
(that is, ( | )P T A must also be low). This fallacious reasoning stems, of course, from assuming 
that the ratio ( | ) / ( )P A T P A  in equation (1) is equal to unity (Thompson and Schumann, 
1987; Aitken, 1996). 
 
 In Medicine it has, for example, been used to analyse the efficacy of breast screening.  
Proponents of screening would argue, on the basis of the “screening fallacy”, that because the 
probability of the screen returning a positive result, given that the patient has cancer, is large 
(that is, ( | )P A T is high), the probability of the patient having cancer, given that the screen 
returns a positive result, must also be large (that is, ( | )P T A must also be high).  This 
fallacious reasoning stems, of course, from assuming that the ratio ( ) / ( )P T P A  in equation (1) 
is equal to unity.  However, if the proportion of persons with cancer in the population, 
relative to the proportion of positive screen results, is small (i.e. ( | ) / ( )P A T P A  in equation 
                                                 
17
 See “In Praise of Bayes”, The Economist, 28 September 2000. 
18
 The updating factor is the ratio of the probability of observing the data when the theory is true, to that of 
observing the data regardless of whether the theory is true or false: ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( )P A P A T P T P A T P T  , T  
being the event that the theory is false. 
  31 
(1) is low) then ( | )P T A could be appreciably smaller than ( | )P A T .  The size of this 
difference represents cancer “over diagnosis” and has, recently, been estimated at 10 percent 
(Zackrisson et. al., 2006): in effect, 1 in 10 women diagnosed with breast cancer undergoes 
unnecessary treatment. 
 
 These ideas can also be applied to the labour market performance of different 
population subgroups.  Suppose there is a favourable labour market outcome – say, being in 
regular salaried or wage employment (hereafter, “regular employment”) – denoted by the 
event T and that membership of a particular group is denoted by the event A.  Then we might 
be interested in computing the probability of a person being in regular employment, given 
that he belongs to a particular group: P(T|A).  From equation (1) we can write this as the 
product of the probability of a person belonging to the group, given that he is in regular 
employment (i.e. (P(A|T), the proportion of persons in regular employment who are from that 
group) and the ratio of the total number of persons in regular employment to the total number 
in the group (i.e. P(T)/(PA)). 
 
The “employment fallacy” would be to argue that because only a small proportion of 
persons in regular employment are from the group (ie. P(A/T) is low), the probability of a 
person from that group being in regular employment must also be small (ie. P(T/A) is also 
low).  As equation (1) shows this reasoning is valid if, and only if, the “proportionality 
condition” meaning that the group‟s share in regular employment is equal to its population 
share (i.e. P(T)/P(A) = 1).  Otherwise, the ratio P(T)/(PA) in equation (1) cannot be ignored; 
if, say, the total number of persons in regular employment is large, relative to the size of the 
group, then P(T|A) could be high even though P(A|T) is low.      
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Technical Note 2 : The Analytical Framework  
Suppose there are four groups – FC Hindus (H), Hindus from the OBC (O), Muslims 
(M), and Dalits (D) - and two categories of employment – regular (R) and non-regular 
employment (C). Then, the probabilities of a person from group X (X being FC or OBC 
Hindu, Muslim or Dalit) being in regular and in non-regular employment are, respectively: 
 
( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( )
( | )   and ( | )
( ) ( )
P X R P R P X C P C
P R X P C X
P X P X
    
Then the Employment Risk Ratio (ERR) of non-regular to regular employment, associated 
with belonging to group X, is: 
 
( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( )
( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( )
( | ) ( ) ( )
( | ) ( ) ( )
X
X
P C X P X C P C P X
P R X P X P X R P R
P X C P C P C
P X R P R P R
   
   
 (2) 
where:
( | )
( | )
X P X C
P X R
   is the Employment Bayes Factor (EBF), of regular to non-regular 
employment, applied to persons who belong to group X.   
 
The ERR is the odds of a hypothesis being “true” (the person is in non-regular 
employment) to another, competing, hypothesis being “true” (the person is in regular 
employment) under a particular set of data (the person belongs to group X).  On the other 
hand, the EBF is the odds of the data (the person belongs to group X) being observed when a 
hypothesis is true (the person is in non-regular employment) to the data being observed when 
another, competing, hypothesis is true (the person is in regular employment): 1( 1)X X    , 
signifies that a person is more (less) likely to be belong to group X if he is in non-regular 
employment than if he is in regular employment (Matthews, 2000).  
 
An alternative view of risk is provided by posing the following question: given two 
persons – one a FC Hindu, the other a Dalit - what is the ratio of their probabilities of being 
in regular employment?   In order to answer this question, the relevant “risk ratio” is the 
Group Risk Ratio (GRR),
( | )
( | )
P R H
P R D
.  The GRR, which is the odds of a person being in regular 
employment under two different sets of data – the person is a FC Hindu (H); the person is a 
Dalit (D) - may be evaluated as:  
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( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( )
( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( )
( | ) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( )
,  where: 
( | ) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( )
R
HD
R R R
HD HD HD
P R H P H R P R P D
P R D P H P D R P R
P H R P D P D P H R P H
P D R P H P H P D R P D


 
     
 (3) 
R
HD  can be termed the Group Bayes  Factor (GBF), of Hindus to Dalits, applied to persons 
who are in regular employment.  The GBF is the odds of observing one set of data (say, the 
person is a FC Hindu) to observing another, competing, set of data (say, the person is a Dalit) 
when the null hypothesis is true (a person is in regular employment): 1( 1)R RHD HD    means 
that a person in regular employment is more (less) likely to be a Hindu than a Dalit.  
 
